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Toward Recognition of Nonsmokers' Rights in Illinois
Air pollution has been an especially important topic of discussion
in recent times. However, the focus has primarily been on the large,
industrial polluter. Relatively little attention has been given to the
pollution caused by the individual. To ,be sure, examples of restrictions on individual pollution can be found. For instance, prohibitions
on open burning have been enacted in Illinois which place restrictions
on individuals as well as on industry.' The automobile has also been
recognized as a source of pollution. However, although the automobile involves pollution by individuals, the approach to solving this problem has consisted primarily of demands on automobile manufacturers
rather than restrictions on individual use of the motor vehicle.'
The problem addressed in this note is a highly individual form of
pollution-tobacco smoke. Industry is only involved in producing this
pollution to the extent of manufacturing the instrumentality, such as
the pipe, cigar, cigarette, and variations on these forms. The realities of the tobacco smoking process make it difficult to envision practical requirements for pollution control devices which can be imposed
on the tobacco industry as they have been imposed on the automobile
industry.
Tobacco smoking has been discussed in the popular press at length
with respect to its dangers to the -health of the smoker. 3 In 1964,
the Surgeon General reaffirmed the position taken by the Public Health
Service as to the ill effects of smoking on -the individual smoker. 4 Re1. ILL.REV. STAT. ch. 111%, § 1009(c) (1973).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1857f-I (1970) (dealing with the establishment of emission standards for motor vehicles). See generally Lanzillotti and Blair, Some Economic and Legal Aspecss of the Pollution Problem--The Automobile: A Case in Point, 24 U. FLA.
L REV. 399 (1972).
3. Typical articles in the press include: New Cancer Data Again Hits Smoking,
SCIENCE DIGEST, May, 1956, at 49; Facts Still Say That Smoking Does Harm, CON-

SUMER REPoRTS, June, 1968, at 338; Researchers Strengthen Case Against Smoking,
TODAY'S HEALTH, September, 1968, at 52; Cigarette Smoking: Objective Evidence for
Lung Damage in Teen-Agers, SCIENCE, May 14, 1973, at 171.
4.
U.S. DE'r OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, & WELFARE, SMOKING AND HEALTH, REPORT OF THE ADVISORY CoMMIrTEE TO THE SURGEON GENERAL OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH

SERwcE 7 (1964).
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cently, however, the attention has shifted from the smoker himself to
the effects that his habit imposes on those in his immediate vicinity.'
The Surgeon General has also added his voice to those who assert
that tobacco smoke is harmful to the nonsmoker.6
Scientific analysis has revealed that cigarette smoke contains toxic
substances, such as carbon monoxide, hydrogen cyanide, and nitrogen
dioxide, as well as tar and nicotine. Cigarette smoke contains 250
parts per million (ppm) of nitrogen dioxide while concentrations as
low as 5 ppm are considered dangerous. Long-term exposure to hydrogen cyanide above 10 ppm is considered dangerous, but cigarette
smoke contains 1600 ppm of hydrogen cyanide. Concentrations as
high as 100 ppm of carbon monoxide often occur in tunnels and garages. This is a small concentration compared to the 42,000 ppm of
carbon monoxide found in cigarette smoke.7
Naturally, these concentrations dissipate to lower levels upon being
released into the air; otherwise the smoker would not survive. However, the scientific evidence now indicates that the levels of noxious
gases are not reduced to a healthful level in many situations. Studies
on carbon monoxide, the subject of more study in relation 'to smoking
than the other toxic substances in tobacco smoke,' demonstrate the
dangers to the nonsmoker. Carbon monoxide is a poisonous gas
formed by the incomplete burning of any fuel containing carbon.
When inhaled in the lungs along with oxygen, carbon monoxide is absorbed by the hemoglobin in the blood to a greater extent than the
oxygen, forming carboxyhemoglobin. 9 This process results in a deprivation of oxygen to the body tissues and vital organs, causing them
to function improperly. The Surgeon General has reported that the
carboxyhemoglobin levels can be raised significantly for both smokers
and nonsmokers in improperly ventilated smoke-filled rooms"0 be5. Banzhaf III, Please put your cigarette out; the smoke is killing me! TODAY'S
HEALTH, April, 1972, at 38-41; Ban on Public Smoking? NEWSWEEK, Jan. 25, 1971,
at 90-91.
6. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES
OF SMOKING: A REPORT TO THE SURGEON GENERAL: (1972)
121-31 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as 1972 SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT].
7. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, SMOKING AND HEALTH; REPORT
OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE SURGEON GENERAL OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH SERV-

ICE 60, Table 4 (1964).
8. The importance of obtaining and evaluating information on nitrogen dioxide in
cigarette smoke-filled rooms was noted in the 1972 report of the Surgeon General because of results of a study in which bronchial and pulmonary parenchymal lesions were
observed in rodents continuously exposed to low levels of nitrogen dioxide. 1972 SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 6, at 124.

9.

BNA,

NAT'L AIR POLLUTION CONTROL ADMIN.,

CRITERIA FOR CARBON MONOX-

IDE, cited in ENVIRON. REP. (FED. LAWS) §§ 31:1951, 1952 (1970).
10. 1972 SURGEON GENERAL's REPORT, supra note 6, at 125. A study of the car-
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cause the carbon monoxide level in such rooms can range from 20
to 80 ppm and above.'1 Lower concentrations can also produce adverse effects, particularly if the individual is exposed to a smoke-filled

room for longer periods.

12

To place these concentrations into perspective, consideration of cer-

tain accepted standards is useful.

For a person working a forty-hour

week, consisting of five eight-hour days, the level of carbon monoxide
set as the time-weighted occupational Threshold Limit Value is 50
ppm,' 3 and a reduction in this level to 35 ppm is under consideration.' 4 The levels more recently set by the Environmental Protection
Agency as the primary and secondary ambient air quality standards

for carbon monoxide are even lower: 9 ppm, maximum eight-hours
concentration, not to be exceeded more than once per year, and 35
ppm, maximum one-hour concentration, also not to be exceeded more
than once per year. 15
The physiological effects of exposure to levels of carbon monoxide
approximating 50 to 100 ppm are diverse, such as altered auditory
discrimination,'" visual acuity,17 ability to distinguish relative brightness,' 8 and impaired time interval discrimination.' 9
boxyhemoglobin level in two nonsmokers rose from 2 to 5 percent (that of smokers,
from 5 to 10 percent) when seated in a cigarette smoke contaminated car where the
level of carbon monoxide was at 90 ppm. Another study team observed that when
seven nonsmokers were exposed for approximately 90 minutes to a "smoked" room containing 30 ppm of carbon monoxide, there was a rise in carboxyhemoglobin from a
mean of 0.9% to 2.0% (from 3.3% to 7.5% for smokers). Id.
11. Id. at 127. The 1972 Surgeon General's Report noted several controlled experiments in this area: for instance, the smoking of ten cigarettes in an enclosed car produced carbon monoxide levels up to 90 ppm. Another study team, working with a
ventilated chamber, found levels of carbon monoxide up to 20 ppm concentration after
seven cigarettes were smoked in a one-hour period; however, significantly, the team
recorded peaks of carbon monoxide concentrations up to 90 ppm at the seat next to
the smoker. A third team reported 80 ppm of carbon monoxide in an enclosed room,
18 by 20 feet, with a 10-foot ceiling, where sixty-two cigarettes were smoked in two
hours. Id. at 123.
12. Exposure to eight or more hours of carbon monoxide concentrations 10 to 15
ppm will produce a level of carboxyhemoglobin which has been associated with adverse
health effects, as manifested by impaired time-interval discrimination. Evidence also
indicates that exposure to eight or more hours of carbon monoxide concentrations of
30 ppm can cause impaired performance on psychomotor tests and impairment in visual discrimination. Id. at 126.
13. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.93, Table G-1 (1973).
14. BNA, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH REPORTER Vol. 3, No. 13, at 373 (Aug.
30, 1973).
15. 40 C.F.R. § 50.8 (1973).
16. 1972 SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 6, at 125.
17. Id. at 126. In another study, doctors at Stanford University School of Medicine
observed that exposure to 50 ppm of carbon monoxide impaired visual acuity as much
as 5 %; and, after one hour, 17 % impairment occurred. CCH CLEAN AIR & WATER
NEWS Vol. 4, No. 11, at 169 (March 16, 1972).
18. 1972 SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 6, at 126.
19. Id. The Surgeon General's Report cites a study in which the driving ability
of three subjects under varying carbon monoxide exposures was observed. The pres-
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The above hazards can affect any normal individual. A variety of
other annoying symptoms observed in the nonsmoker exposed to
smoke-filled surroundings have also been noted. These symptoms include eye irritation, nasal symptoms, headache, cough, and sore
throat. 20 Work productivity can also be affected. 2 A more serious
danger is presented to those persons with certain health problems,
such as heart disease22 and emphysema.23 Furthermore, individuals
with a history of allergic reactions have been shown to experience
more frequent adverse responses to tobacco smoke than other nonsmokers. 24 Some individuals have specific allergies to cigarette
smoke itself.25 The number of people suffering from allergy-related
ailments alone form a significant group. In 1971, an estimated 13.5
million individuals suffered from hay fever without asthma; another
8.6 million suffered from asthma; and an additional 8.6 million displayed symptoms of other allergies.2 6
Given ,the dangers presented by exposure to tobacco smoke, what
can the nonsmoker do to protect himself? Appraising the situation
realistically, staying within one's own walls is hardly practical. The
average person must trade in stores to purchase the goods he needs,
spend time at his place of employment, occasionally visit government
offices to conduct business required of him as a citizen, and perhaps
ride public transportation. The average nonsmoker also prefers not
ence of 10% carboxyhemoglobin was associated with increased response time for taillight discrimination and increased variance in distance estimation. Another study cited
by the Surgeon General's 1972 Report revealed errors in cognitive and choice discrimination tests at carboxyhemoglobin levels as low as 3%. Id.
20. Id. at 128. See also the findings reported by the Civil Aeronautics Board, 38
Fed. Reg. 12207, 12209 (1973).
21. CCH CLEAN AIR & WATER NEWS Vol. 4 No. 18, at 279 (May 5, 1972). In
a study conducted by the U.S. Army Research Institute of Environmental Medicine,
subjects were exposed to 225 ppm of carbon monoxide. Since the body gets less oxygen under these conditions, the heart speeds up and works harder. The work capacity
of the subjects dropped significantly.
22.
U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, CRITERIA FOR A RECOMMENDED
STANDARD . . . OCCUPATIONAL EXPOSURE TO CARBON MONOXIDE 111-14 and 111-18

(1972)
23.

[hereinafter cited as CRITERIA FOR A RECOMMENDED STANDARD, 1972].
F. OBLEY, M.D., EMPHYSEMA, A DOCTOR'S ADVICE FOR PATIENTS AND THEIR FAM-

ILIES 103 (1970).
The author streses that emphysema patients are warned by doctors that cigarette smoke so seriously affects their lungs that they should stay out of
rooms where others are smoking.
24. 1972 SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 6, at 128. The Surgeon General's Report discusses a study of two groups, one composed of individuals having a history of allergic reactions and the other composed of individuals without an allergic reaction history. About 70% of both groups experienced eye irritation, but the frequency
of other symptoms differed markedly between the two groups. (1) Nasal symptoms:
67%, allergic group; 29%, nonallergic group; (2) headache: 46%, allergic group; 31%
nonallergic group; (3) cough: 46%, allergic group; 25%, nonallergic group; and (4)
wheezing: 22%, allergic group; 4%, nonallergic group.
25. Id. at 129.
26. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, ALLERGY RESEARCH-AN
INTRODUCTION (1972).
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to be constructively evicted by tobacco smoke from places of amusement, including theatres and restaurants.

To be sure, certain regulations concerning smoking on public transportation have been promulgated in recent years.27 An occasional fire
2s
regulation also provides incidental protection for the nonsmoker;
provided, of course, that the regulation is observed. However, such

occasional regulation of smoking hardly provides the comprehensive
protection that medical research indicates may now be required. This
note will examine possible legal bases for the assertion of nonsmokers'
rights in the State of Illinois. Relevant federal law, where it overlaps the state law, will be discussed.
Tobacco smoke pollution can be characterized as a special kind of
air pollution, caused by individuals rather than by industry, creating
its dangers through the accumulated efforts of several polluters rather
than through the discharges of one or a few local industrial polluters,
and occurring within enclosures rather than in the general external
atmosphere. The traditional legal approaches to air pollution will be
examined for their applicability in the context of this somewhat unique

type of pollution.
CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS

To many thoughtful persons a right to breathe clean air seems so
fundamental that it would be expected to be constitutionally protected. 29 However, no doubt owing to the fact that the problems presented by modem technology did not face our forefathers, the United

States Constitution lacks explicit language on which to rest environmental
rights.
27. The Interstate Commerce Commission provided for the allocation of separate
space for smokers and nonsmokers on trains on January 4, 1974. 39 Fed. Reg. 1047,
The Civil Aeronautics Board also provided for designation of "No
1051 (1974).
Smoking" areas on aircraft operated by certificated air carriers on May 10, 1973. 38
The Municipal Code of Chicago prohibits smoking
Fed. Reg. 12207, 12210 (1973).
on any public conveyance having a capacity of more than seven passengers and operat-

ing within the city limits of Chicago.

CHICAGO, ILL., CODE

§ 193-7.10 (1969).

28. The Municipal Code of Chicago prohibits smoking in public elevators and retail
stores employing more than fifteen persons where merchandise is displayed for sale,
thereby attracting crowds within small areas. The ordinance declares that smoking in
such places is a menace to public health, safety, and property. However, the exclusion
from the provisions of the ordinance of areas set apart for serving food or beverages,
waiting or rest rooms, beauty parlors, executive offices, and other rooms or areas where
merchandise is not exposed demonstrates that the chief interest protected is property
rather than health. CHICAGO, ILL., CODE § 193-7.9 (1969).
29. Senator Gaylord Nelson, upon introducing an amendment to the United States
Constitution which would recognize an inalienable right to a decent environment said,
"If we have a right that is more important than any other right, it is the right to
116 CONG. REc. 85 (1970).
live in a clean and decent environment ......
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The absence of explicit language in the Constitution has led to
efforts to infer the right to a decent environment from the due process
clause or the ninth amendment. There are few judicial decisions,
however, recognizing a general environmental right under the Constitution. One judge did find that he had
no difficulty in finding that the right to life and liberty and
property are constitutionally protected. Indeed the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments provide that these rights may not be denied without due process of law, and surely a person's health is
what, in a most significant degree, sustains life. 80
However, the court could not apply this constitutional right because
the polluter was a private company. In the absence of state action, the
court found that there could be no violation of the constitutional right,
thus denying relief and pointing out another important obstacle in
asserting such rights under the United States Constitution. 1
Commentators have also advanced the ninth amendment 2 as a basis
for the right to a decent environment.3 " The theory is that the ninth
amendment guarantees fundamental liberties not specifically enumerated in the Bill of Rights and that one of these is the right to a decent
environment. Even those advancing the theory recognize that the
lawyer faces some important problems in basing an environmental action on the ninth amendment. For instance, he must demonstrate that
the ninth amendment does constitute a basis for asserting rights not
enumerated in the Constitution, that the right to a decent environment
is one of those protected but unenumerated rights, and that this right
84
has been violated in the particular case before the court.
Although the ninth amendment has been used by the Supreme
Court to protect rights not specifically stated in the Constitution,3 5 the
ninth amendment has not proved to be a successful basis for environmental rights. For instance, in United States v. 247.37 Acres of
Land3 6 a federal district court refused to apply the ninth amendment
as a basis for environmental rights where a landowner attempted to
assert a right to the preservation of property in its natural state against
the government's power to acquire property for governmental pur30. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hoerner Waldorf Corp., 3 E.L.R. 20794
(D. Mont. 1970).
31.

Id. at 20795.

32.

U.S. CONST. amend. IX.

'The

enumeration in the Constitution, of certain

rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."
33. Beckman, The Right to a Decent Environment under The Ninth Amendment,
46 Los ANGELES B. BULL. 415 (1971).

34.

Id. at 416.

35.

E.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).

36.

1 E.L.R. 20513 (S.D. Ohio 1971).
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poses. The court held that such a determination would have to be
made by the Supreme Court before this lower court would recognize
it.

87

A typical comment was that made by the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals in Ely v. Velde,3 8 in which local citizens sought to prevent
the state from building a new penal facility in an area of historic importance. The court stated: "While a growing number of commentators argue in support of a constitutional protection for the environment,
this newly-advanced constitutional doctrine has not yet been accorded
judicial sanction . . . 3.
The discouraging response of the courts to current constitutional
doctrine as a basis for environmental rights has led to suggestions that
a constitutional amendment be adopted which specifically guarantees
the right to a decent environment. 40 Significantly, many commentators point to article XI of the Illinois Constitution as an example of
innovative, modem draftsmanship of constitutional protection of the
4
environment. 1
Section 1 of article XI of the Illinois Constitution provides: "The
public policy of the State and the duty of each person is to provide
and maintain a healthful environment for the benefit of this and future
generations." Section 2 of article XI puts teeth into -this declaration
of policy by vesting each person with the right to a healthful environment: "Each person may enforce this right against any party, governmental or private, through appropriate legal proceedings subject
to reasonable limitation and regulation as the General Assembly may
provide by law."
The Illinois Constitution, then, provides an individual right to a healthful environment. The Illinois provision may be contrasted to those found
in other state constitutions which speak more in terms of a public right.
For instance, Rhode Island's constitution says -that the people "shall
be secure in their rights to the use and enjoyment of the natural resources of the state with due regard for the preservation of 'their
values .... *42 Pennsylvania's constitution provides: "The people
37. Id. at 20515.
38. Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130 (4th Cir. 1971).
39. Id. at 1139. Also see Virginians for Dulles v. Volpe, 344 F. Supp. 573 (E.D.
Va. 1972); Hagedorn v. Union Carbide Corp., 363 F. Supp. 1061 (N.D. W. Va. 1973).
40. Ottinger, Legislation and Environment: Individual Rights and Government Accountability, 55 CORNELL L. REV. 666, 671-72 (1970). See also Platt, Toward Constitutional Recognition of the Environment, 56 A.B.A.J. 1061 (1970).
41. Note, Constitutionalismand Ecology, 48 N. DAK. L. REV. 307, 324-25 (1972);
Howard, State Constitutions and the Environment, 58 VA. L. REV. 193, 197 (1972);
Platt, Toward Constitutional Recognition of the Environment, 56 A.B.A.J. 1061, 106364 (1970).
42. R.I. CONST. art. I, § 17.

616

1974

Nonsmokers' Rights

have a right to clean air, pure water, and to the preservation of the
43
natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of the environment.
The language of the Illinois provision is significant in the context of
nonsmokers' rights because it speaks directly to the right of each person rather than the public at large and in terms of health rather than
in terms of the preservation of natural resources and esthetic values
of the environment. As a result, the application of the Illinois constitutional language to nonsmokers' rights is easier and more direct than
the application of the Rhode Island and Pennsylvania provisions.
The Illinois provision goes even further than to provide the right
to a healthful environment. It also creates standing to sue to enforce
one's right to a healthful environment. This is an important provision
because it overrules the common law requirement that an Illinois
plaintiff must have suffered special damages, apart from those suffered
by the general public, before he has standing to protect his health.44
The provision also allows a person to sue either public or private parties, thus eliminating the state action problem exemplified by Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hoerner Waldorf Corp.4 5
The definitions contained in the Committee Report presented to the
Illinois Constitutional Convention further indicate the possible applicability of the Illinois provision to the nonsmokers' rights problem. The
Committee Report stated that the word "healthful" was meant to describe "that quality of physical environment which a reasonable man
,"6 By the
would select for himself were a free choice available ..
word "environment" was meant the "aggregate of all conditions affecting the existence, growth and welfare of organisms.""
Analysis of the Illinois provisions has led one commentator to remark:
Illinois has boldly and explicitly placed the right to a healthful
environment on a plane with other more familiar inalienable rights
such as the right to life, liberty and the pursuit of 48happiness; rights
which are not subject to the whims of the majority.
43. PA. CONST. art. I, § 27.
44. Explaining the common law doctrine, the Committee on General Government
said in its report: "The theory is that a wrong or tort which is suffered by the public
in general is a public injury which can only be asserted by the Attorney General. Unless an individual can show . . . a 'special injury,' he will be said to have no 'standing'
and will not be afforded the opportunity to seek relief." S.H.A. CONST. art. 11, § 2
(1970) [Illinois, Constitutional Commentary].
45. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hoerner Waldorf Corp., 3 E.L.R. 20794
(D. Mont. 1970). See text accompanying notes 30 and 31.
46. S.H.A. CONST. art. 11, § 2 (1970) [Illinois, Constitutional Commentary].
47. Id.

48.

Note, Constitutionalismand Ecology, 48 N. DAK. L. REv.307, 324 (1972).
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Examined in the context of nonsmokers' rights, however, this new inalienable right may prove to be illusory due to the practical realities
of bringing suit under article XI.
It has been pointed out that article XI has its own "built-in inhibiting factors"4' 9 because the plaintiff has a double burden of proof: (1)
that the defendant pollutes and (2) that the particular pollution involved causes damage to health. 0 Although it should not be difficult
to prove that the defendant pollutes by smoking his cigarette in a nonsmokers' rights case, proof that his particular pollution causes damage
to health may be difficult.
This is the area in which the uniqueness of the nonsmokers' rights
problem comes into play. As noted earlier, the dangers of tobacco
smoke pollution generally arise from the accumulated efforts of many
people in an enclosure. Any one person only contributes his share
of the damage and the courts cannot hold him responsible for any
more than his share. In this connection, it should be noted that the
Committee on General Government in its report emphasized that
allowing standing does not assume proof of the claim and that the
section does not create any new remedies. So the plaintiff is left with
the traditional remedies of declaratory judgment, injunction or damages if he has strict proof of economic personal injury."
The damages from one exposure to one person's smoke, or even
one exposure to several persons' smoke, are likely to be too minimal
to sustain the expense of a traditional lawsuit. Furthermore, due to
the number of smokers and their general ubiquity, endless lawsuits,
ending in the recognition of a right but no real remedy, would need
to be brought. Put simply, it is not practical to bring suit against each
smoker contacted in an effort to eventually eradicate all tobacco smoke
pollution in the individual's environment.
NUISANCE LAW BASIs

The role of nuisance law in combatting air pollution has been extensively examined, but not with reference to its application to nonsmokers' rights.5" Due to the importance of nuisance doctrine to the
49. Leahy, Individual Legal Remedies Against Pollution in Illinois, 3 LoYoLA Cm.
L.J. 1, 6 (1972).

50.

Id.

51. S.H.A. CONST. art. 11, § 2 [Illinois, Constitutional Commentary].
52. See generally Porter, The Role of Private Nuisance Law in the Control of Air
Pollution, 10 Aiuz. L. REv. 107 (1968).
Rice, Pollution as a Nuisance: Problems,
Prospects, and Proposals, 34 ATL L.J. 202 (1972); Note, Constitutionalism and Ecology, 48 N. DAK. L. REv. 307 (1972).
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area of pollution, a separate discussion of the role of nuisance law in
relation to tobacco smoke pollution is warranted. Nuisance law is generally classified into private nuisance and public nuisance because the
rights that are violated by these two types of nuisances are different,
although they can occur concurrently.
In one private nuisance case, Hall v. Putney,53 the court defined
nuisance as "everything that endangers life or health, gives offense
to senses, violates the law of decency, or obstructs reasonable and
comfortable use of property. '5 4 A later Illinois decision defined a
private nuisance as "an individual wrong arising from an unreasonable,
unwarrantable or unlawful use of one's property producing 'such
material annoyance, inconvenience, discomfort, or hurt that the law
will -presume a consequent damage.' ,55
However, as broad as these
statements are with respect to the nature of private nuisance, the context within which they were made involved violation of property rights.
The Hall case involved noises, such as honking of horns, screeching
of brakes, starting of engines, and closing of automobile doors, made
by customers of a root beer stand located near the plaintiff's residence. 56 Merriam v. McConnell, the later Illinois case, involved the
depreciation of property value of the plaintiff's residence due to infestation of the area by box elder bugs attracted by the defendant's box
57
elder trees.
Indeed, although the law of nuisance has dealt with the question
of air pollution, recognition of the right to be free from such pollution
has traditionally been based on the right of the property owner, as
a property owner, to have the air over his premises reasonably free
from contamination. 58 Such cases, stressing the violation of property
rights, are inapplicable in the nonsmokers' rights context. The average nonsmoker can protect himself from tobacco smoke on his own
53. Hall v. Putney, 291 Ill. App. 508, 10 N.E.2d 204 (1937).
54. Id. at 516, 10 N.E.2d at 207.
55. Merriam v. McConnell, 31 111. App. 2d 241, 244, 175 N.E.2d 293, 295 (1961).
56. 291 Ill. App. 508, 10 N.E.2d 204 (1937).
57. 31 Ill. App. 241, 175 N.E.2d 293 (1961).
58. E.g., Feder v. Perry Coal Co., 279 Ill. App. 314 (1935) (damage to livestock,
crops and habitation caused by gases, fumes, and smoke coming onto plaintiff's property from a burning slag pile located on defendant's property); O'Connor v. Aluminum
Ore Co., 224 Ill. App. 613 (1922) (dangerous acids and gases carried by wind onto
neighbor's residence. Court denied recovery due to insufficiency of proof but said it
would have allowed recovery for an eye injury received by the plaintiff from these
gases and acids where the plaintiff was deprived of the use of her property due to
the nuisance and received the personal injury while on her property); Winters v. Winters, 78 Ill. App. 417 (1898) (dust, chaff and smoke blown into plaintiff's house to
the injury of his furniture); Lindblom v. Purity Ice & Refrigerating Co., 217 Ill. App.

306 (1920)

(mist caused by operation of an ice plant interfering with use of rooms

on the south side of plaintiff's house).
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property, and such smoke generally does not occur in quantities sufficient to do actionable damage to his property.
A second problem in applying private nuisance law to nonsmokers'
rights is that the private nuisance must interfere with the enjoyment
by an individual or a determinate number of individuals of some right
not common to the public.5" The general right to breathe clean air,
if found by a court at all, will surely be found as a right of the public
at large and not for a privileged few.
Further, the tradition of nuisance law as to damage shown may require more proof than the individual smoker can show in any single
case against one smoker or even a group of smokers.6" This problem
has been noted in analyses of other types of pollution.6 1
Public, or common, nuisances, on the other hand, are those nuisances which affect or annoy the public generally.62 Some public nuisances have been specifically enumerated by statute. However, none
of those enumerated are even remotely applicable to nonsmokeri
rights. 63 Further, there has been recent indication that the public
59. Edelman Bros., Inc. v. Baikoff, 277 Ill. App. 432 (1934).
60. In Cooper v. Randall, 59 Ill. 317 (1871), a case also demonstrating the importance of invasion of property rights in this area, the supreme court approved the following instruction:
The law does not give damages for every inconvenience to, or interruption
of the rights of another. There are numerous annoyances which, in the nature and condition of society, must inevitably arise and accrue to property
of individuals, which can not in themselves fix a legal liability on the persons
causing such inconvenience or interruption. The injury for which the law
gives damages must be real, and not imaginary or whimsical. It must be sensible, tangible, and material, and not simply inconvenience or trifling interruption, and unless such injury has been inflicted in this case, the jury should
find for defendants.
Id. at 324-25. See also Flood v. Consumers Co., 105 111. App. 559, 562 (1903), where
the court held that it is not enough that the nuisance diminishes the value of surrounding property, that it renders other property unsalable, or that it prevents one from letting his premises for as large a rent as before, or to as responsible tenants. The court
said that there must be a tangible or appreciable injury to the property or the nuisance
must render enjoyment essentially uncomfortable or unreasonable.
61. "Thousands of people, for example, may suffer the ill effects of air pollution.
This can make total damages enormous without making any suit feasible, since the associated costs to any individual exceed the damages suffered." Lanzillotti and Blair,
Some Economic and Legal Aspects of the Pollution Problem-The Automobile: A
Case in Point, 24 U. FLA. L. REv. 399, 404 (1972).
Tort actions for pollution are best adapted to cases involving single, stationary
sources of pollution. The reason for this lies largely in the difficulties that
may be encountered by plaintiffs in satisfying burden of proof and loss apportionment requirements in multiple source pollution cases. Unfortunately, one
might expect in this urbanized, industrialized society to find the multiple
source pollution situation to be much more common than the single source
situation.
Rice, Pollution as a Nuisance: Problems, Prospects, and Proposals, 34 ATL L.J. 202,
213 (1972).
62. Kuhn v. Illinois Central R. Co., 111 Ill. App. 323 (1903).
63. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 100 , § 26 (1973). Enumeration includes fouling of rivers, ponds, etc., obstructing highways, carrying on ultrahazardous businesses, use of
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nuisance statutes will be literally construed on the ground that the determination of what constitutes a nuisance should be made by the
64
legislature and not by the courts.
Although the enumeration of public nuisances in the Illinois statutes
does not preclude an action based on common law,65 such a suit is
unlikely to be successful, partly because the area is not as clear
in the absence of statute when applied to a new area like nonsmokers'
rights and partly because there may be a developing constriction in
the recognition of nuisance actions other than those enumerated in the
statute. 66
The remedies provided for a public nuisance may not be particularly
helpful in the assertion of nonsmokers' rights. Public relief is
asserted either through indictment or injunction. The injunction is
generally granted where a nuisance is injurious to the public health
and safety, particularly where the ordinary method of prosecution for
criminal offense proves ineffective."
However, the effectiveness of
either remedy, indictment or injunction, is doubtful in the nonsmokers'
rights context. The nature of these remedies makes them more suitable for nuisances that are relatively stationary, that come from one
primary source, and for which a relatively few defendants can be both
identified and held responsible.68
Traditional public nuisance law did require that a private person
show special injury, different in kind and not merely different in degree from that suffered by the general public. 69 This requirement
buildings in a business causing exhalation of noxious or offensive smells, and advertise-

ment on private property without consent of the owner. See also id., § 1, declaring
buildings used for lewdness, assignation, or prostitution to be public nuisances.
64. People v. Goldman, 7 Ill. App. 3d 253, 287 N.E.2d 177 (1972).
The court
refused to extend the reading of the statute declaring buildings used for lewdness, as-

signation or prostitution as public nuisances to cover defendant's business, the Adult
Book and Camera Shop. The judge refused to enjoin defendant from displaying or

disseminating lewd material and promoting a "Swingers Club."
65. People v. Clark, 268 I1l. 156, 108 N.E. 994 (1915).
66. People v. Goldman, 7 111. App. 3d 253, 287 N.E.2d 177 (1972). At least one
commentator has noted that most recent public nuisance cases have referred to statutes.
Note, Symposium: The Law of Nuisances in Illinois, 43 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 173, 187

(1967).
67.

Stead v. Fortner, 171 II1. App. 161, affd, 255 Ill. 468, 99 N.E. 680 (1912);

State v. Brush, 318 II1. 307, 149 N.E. 262 (1925); City of Sterling v. Speroni, 336

I11. App. 590, 84 N.E.2d 667 (1949).
68. People ey rel. Barrett v. Fritz, 316 Ill. App. 217, 45 N.E.2d 48 (1942), is an

exception to this theory.

The Attorney General attempted to enjoin 1400 defendants

from open and notorious violations of gambling laws.

The Attorney General was un-

successful in this action due to a defective complaint rather than to the practical difficulties. However, the prospect of joining countless tobacco smokers in a suit by the
Attorney General where no criminal law has been broken would present far greater
obstacles to success even if the Attorney General could be convinced to attempt such

an approach to the problem.
69. Swain & Son v. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R., 252 Ill. 622, 97 N.E. 247 (1911); Joos
v. Illinois National Guard, 257 I11. 138, 100 N.E. 505 (1912).
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may have been removed by the new constitutional provision already
discussed.7 0 However, the suit by the individual private party, in addition to the problem of expense, is not likely to be any more effective
than the pursuit of relief by the state because of the number of people
who must be joined and the apportionment of injury which would have
to be proved against each.
In conclusion, nuisance law, whether public or private, cannot be
expected to contribute very much in the absence of legislative provisions for a realistic remedy.
STATUTORY BASIS

The EnvironmentalProtectionAct
Like the federal government, 71 Illinois has enacted legislation to
protect the environment within its own state boundaries. 7 ' The Illinois General Assembly declared that environmental damage seriously
affects the public health and welfare.7r Among the targets of the llinois Environmental Protection Act is air pollution, which, the General
Assembly found,
constitutes a menace to public health and welfare, creates public nuisances, adds to cleaning costs, accelerates the deterioration of materials, adversely affects agriculture, business, industry,
recreation, climate, and visibility, depresses property values, and
74
offends the senses.
Air pollution has been defined as the
presence in the atmosphere of one or more air contaminants
in sufficient quantities and of such characteristics and duration as
to be injurious to human, plant, or animal life, to health, or to
property, or to unreasonably interfere with the enjoyment of life
or property.7
Tobacco smoke, of course, fits into more than one of the enumerated
effects of air pollution in this broad legislative statement and certainly
fits the definition of air pollution, given a broad definition of "atmosphere." Because of these effects of air pollution, the declared purpose of the air pollution provisions is to restore, maintain, and enhance
the purity of the air in order to protect health, welfare, property, and
quality of life.76 This broad declared purpose of the Act, then, could
70.
71.

See text accompanying note 44 supra.
42 U.S.C. § 1857 (1970) (Clean Air Act).

72.

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111%, § 1001 et seq. (1973).

73.

Id. § 1002(a)(i).

74.
75.
76.

Id. § 1008.
Id. § 1003(b).
Id. § 1008.
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also be interpreted to protect the interests of the nonsmoker.
As might be suspected, however, the focus on air pollution has resulted in an Act designed ,to regulate outdoor pollution while the nonsmokers' rights problem arises almost exclusively in an indoor setting.
The prohibited acts specified in the air pollution provisions fall into
five categories: (1) discharging contaminants into the environment
in any state so as to cause or tend to cause air pollution in Illinois;
(2) installing, constructing, or operating any equipment, facility, vehicle, or aircraft capable of causing or contributing to air pollution
without a permit; (3) open burning of refuse; (4) selling or using
any fuel or other article in any areas where such use or sale has been
forbidden by the Pollution Control Board for reasons of air pollution
control; and (5) spraying loose asbestos in the fireproofing or insulating of buildings or building materials or otherwise using asbestos in
such unconfined manner as to permit asbestos fibers or particles to
pollute the air." It would be straining the language of the Act to
find protection of the individual in an indoor setting in these prohibited acts. The first prohibited act clearly refers to air pollution in
the general outdoor atmosphere and attempts to protect the State of
Illinois from pollution wafting across state borders. The second prohibited act enumerates equipment of a heavy variety, generally used
outdoors or vented to the outdoors, so that the contaminants are discharged into the external atmosphere. The third prohibited act specifically refers to burning refuse in the open. The fourth prohibited
act directs attention to the use of fuels, which are primarily used in
equipment operated outdoors or vented to the outside of buildings,
and also to other unspecified articles. The prohibited use of such
fuels and other articles relates only to areas where sale and use is
forbidden by the Pollution Control Board. The legislature must have
been referring to general outdoor geographical vicinities. If indoor
air had been the concern, the regulation should have operated anywhere, since the air confined inside an enclosure can reach contamination levels higher than the air external to the building. The fifth prohibited act involves asbestos, a material that is particularly hazardous
to the health of all persons coming into contact with it and thus justifying the special attention of the General Assembly. 8
77. Id. § 1009.
78. For an excellent discussion of the dangers of asbestos, see the five-part series
by Brodeur, Annals of Industry, Casualties of the Workplace, NEW YORKER, Oct. 29,
1973, at 44; Nov. 5, 1973, at 92; Nov. 12, 1973, at 131; Nov. 19, 1973, at 87; and
Nov. 26, 1973, at 126.
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Although the Act provides that the Pollution Control Board has general -authority to adopt regulations to promote the purposes of the
air pollution provisions of the Environmental Protection Act,79 the
General Assembly has suggested certain areas for regulations, generally corresponding to the prohibited acts discussed above: ambient air
quality standards; emission standards; standards for issuance of permits
for construction, installation, operation of equipment, facilities, vehicles, vessels and aircraft, as well as requirements 'and procedures for
their inspection, and alert and abatement standards for air pollution
emergencies constituting an acute danger to health. 0
In turn, the regulations promulgated under the Act have tended
to further restrict the application of this legislation to outdoor air exclusively by defining the problem of indoor pollutants right out of any
potential relevance to the Act. For instance, the regulations adopted
pursuant to the Act specifically define ambient air as "that portion of
the atmosphere external -to buildings comprising emission sources.""'
This specific exclusion of indoor air from the ambient air quality standards, coupled with the absence of provision for the adoption of air
quality standards for indoor air, does not merely bolster the argument
that indoor air is not covered- by the Act. The lack of standards for
indoor air quality makes enforcement of the Act with respect to tobacco smoke pollution virtually impossible since a violation of no specific standard is no violation at all. Further, an "air contaminant" is
"any solid, liquid, or gaseous matter, any odor, or any form of energy,
that is capable of being released into the atmosphere from an emission
'
source." 82
Again, a broad definition of atmosphere could bring tobacco smoke pollution within the definition. However, the definition of
emission source is "any equipment or facility capable of emitting specified air contaminants to the atmosphere.18 3 Again, we are led back
to pollution by facilities or heavy equipment where the expectation
is that the pollution will involve the outdoors.
The above discussion leads to the conclusion that tobacco smoke
pollution can be seen to fit into the broad legislative statement of the
general effects of air pollution, the purposes of the Act, and even into
a broad interpretation of the definition of air pollution. However, the
specific statutory language, along with the regulatory machinery de79. ILL. REV.STAT. ch. 111 ,§ 1010 (1973).
80. Id. § 1010.
81. ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD RULES AND
1,effective April 14, 1972, amended June 15, 1973.
82. Id.
83. Id.
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signed to implement the Environmental Protection Act, was intended to
protect the individual in an outdoor setting, primarily from large polluters. Therefore, this statutory basis for assertion of rights against
air pollution is inadequate as a protection for the nonsmoker.
The IllinoisHealth and Safety Act
In 1936, the Illinois legislature first passed the Health and Safety
Act, the purpose of which was to protect the lives, health and safety
of employees in the State of Illinois.8 4 The Illinois General Assembly
amended the Illinois Health and Safety Act in 197285 and in 197388
to provide the enabling legislation that made Illinois the twentieth
state8 7 to receive approval for its state plan for occupational safety
and health under the Federal Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970.88
Among other duties imposed on the employer under the amended
Act is the duty
to provide reasonable protection to the lives, health, and safety
and to furnish to each of his employees employment and a place
of employment which are free from recognized hazards that are
causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm to
89
his employees.
Each employer also has a duty to comply with the occupational,
health and safety standards promulgated under the Art.90 The individual employee also has a duty to comply with any rules promulgated
under the Act that relate to his own conduct. 9 '
The coverage of the Act is very broad. Virtually every employer
and employee in the State of Illinois comes under the provisions of
the amended Act. The only two exceptions relate to employees of
federal agencies and state agencies acting under ,the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954.92
The Illinois Industrial Commission is vested with the power and authority to administer the provisions of the Health and Safety Act.9 3 Pursuant to the Act, the Industrial Commission is to make, promulgate,
84.
85.
86.
87.
uary,
88.

89.
90.
91.

92.
93.

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 137.1 et seq. (1936).

Act of July 1, 1972, P.A. 77-1901.
Act of Sept. 15, 1973, P.A. 78-867.
Illinois OSHA Occupational Safety & Health Bulletin, Vol. 2, No. 1, at 4 (Jan1974).
29 U.S.C. § 667(b) (1970).
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 137.3(a) (1973).
Id. § 137.3(b).
Id. § 137.3(e).
id. § 137.2.
Id. § 137.1.
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and publish rules which will effectuate the purposes of the Act.94
Under the former statute the Industrial Commission's authority to
make rules was limited with respect to the nature of the rules he could
make. 95 These provisions were dropped out of the Act and replaced
with a section providing for rules requiring that records be kept on
deaths, illnesses and injuries, the adoption of federal safety and health
standards as rules, variances from rules, emergency temporary standards and requirements for standards.90
The provision relating to the adoption of federal safety and health
standards as rules is of particular interest to the discussion of nonsmokers' rights. Any standard which the United States Secretary of
Labor has promulgated under the Federal Occupational Safety and
Health Act of 1970 becomes a rule of the Illinois Industrial Commission unless the Industrial Commission promulgates an alternate rule
which is at least as effective as the federal standard in providing safe
and healthful employment and places of employment.9 7 Any standards promulgated in the future by the United States Secretary of
Labor likewise will become the rules of the Illinois Industrial Commission within sixty days of the federal effective date in the absence of
98
an Illinois rule at least as effective.
As noted earlier, the maximum allowable time-weighted average
concentration for carbon monoxide for an eight-hour workday is 50
ppm. 99 Also noted earlier were several experiments demonstrating
that improperly ventilated smoke-filled rooms can greatly exceed such
a level, and that even in a ventilated room, although the general concentration of carbon monoxide is below the standard set, exceedingly
high carbon monoxide concentrations occur in the vicinity of the
smoker.10
This evidence demonstrates the possibility that many
workplaces could be in violation of the federal standard and, therefore,
of the Illinois law, as a result of tobacco smoke pollution.
The Act imposes the duty of enforcing the rules of the Industrial Com94. Id. § 137.3(f).
95. ILL. PEv. STAT. ch. 48, § 137.4 (1936). Two types of rules authorized by the
former provisions were relevant to the nonsmokers' problem. These related to authorization of rules for the ventilation of places of employment to guard against injuries
and disease and rules for the prevention of personal injury and disease by contact with
poisonous or deleterious materials, dust, vapors, gases, or fumes. Id. at (a) and (c).
96. ILL. Rv. STAT. ch. 48, § 137.4 (1973).
97. Id. § 137.4(d).
98.
99.

100.
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mission on the Illinois Department of Labor.' 0 ' The first step for an
employee who believes that a violation of a safety or health standard
exists is to make a complaint to the Department of Labor. If the
Department of Labor fails to issue a notice of violation or take other
enforcement action within a reasonable time after a complaint has
been made, any employees or employee representatives who believe
that a violation of a safety or health standard exists may request a
hearing before the Industrial Commission by filing a written petition
setting forth the details and providing a copy to the employer or his
02
agent and the Department of Labor.'
The amended Health and Safety Act is not a complete solution to
the nonsmokers' rights problem. Protection is provided only to employees in the work environment. The Act does not extend protection to nonworkers or to workers while they are not at their jobs.
However, the significance of protection on the job should not be minimized. The Civil Aeronautics Board saw fit to protect nonsmoking
airline passengers from smoking passengers on the ground that a passenger taking an assigned seat on an airliner cannot escape from tobacco smoke pollution for the duration of his flight.'
Surely, protecting the worker from tobacco smoke while on the job offers him
many more hours of protection during his lifetime than that offered
by regulations protecting him from tobacco smoke while he is traveling on airplanes.
The current provisions of the amended Health and Safety Act also
may not provide adequate protection from carbon monoxide for the
worker while on the job. The standard for concentrations of carbon
monoxide is currently being reviewed to see if it should be reduced
from 50 ppm over an eight-hour period to 35 ppm over an eighthour period, 0 in accordance with the recommendation of the National
Institute for Occupational Safety and Health. 10 5 Current medical evidence suggests that the 50 ppm standard does not adequately protect
the worker against impairments in vigilance, coordination, timing behavior, visual perception, and certain cognitive functions.' 0 6 Even the
101. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 137.17(a) (1973).
102. id. § 137.17(b).
103. 38 Fed. Reg. 12207 (1973).
104. BNA, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH REPORTER Vol. 3, No. 13, at 373
(Aug. 30, 1973).
105. The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health was established under the Federal Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970. The Institute is authorized to develop and establish recommended occupational safety and health standards.
29 U.S.C. § 671 (1970).
106. CRTERA FOR A REcoMMENDED STANDARD, 1972, supra note 22, at V-3. The
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proposed 35 ppm standard may not be sufficient -to protect some
workers with health problems. °7 Also, carbon monoxide is only one
of many harmful constituents of tobacco smoke, the effects of which
have still not been completely evaluated.' 0 8
Further, some practical problems may arise in providing adequate
protection from this problem. The methods adopted in monitoring
for carbon monoxide or any other harmful constituents of tobacco
smoke may not adequately protect the employee, since there is a present lack of first-rate detection devices for the workplace. 0 9 The possible inadequacy of ventilation as a solution has also been noted.
These, of course, are problems involved in the administration of any
standard under the Act. In the case of tobacco smoke, solution may
be found in adequate spacing between employee work stations. Since
the carbon monoxide produced in tobacco smoke is not the product
of a necessary operation of the business involved, the problem could
even be solved by placing an outright prohibition on the production
of carbon monoxide from this source by banning smoking in the workplace, and perhaps limiting smoking to certain reserved areas only.
Since the employee has a recognized duty under the Health and Safety
Act to obey any regulations promulgated under the Act relating to his
own conduct, 1 0 the burden of compliance does not fall solely upon
the employer.
Other common objections to any administrative solution-delay and
inadequate resources to perform adequately-are also applicable to
this potential solution to part of the nonsmokers' rights problem."'
critical factor upon which the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
based the recommended 35 ppm standard was the level of carboxyhemoglobin which
that concentration of carbon monoxide would produce upon continuous eight-hour exposure in a nonsmoker engaged in sedentary activity. Id. at V-5.
107. Id. The Institute bases its recommended standard upon cardiovascular and behavioral evidence documenting the initiation or enhancement of deleterious myocardial
alterations in individuals with coronary heart disease who are exposed to carbon monoxide concentrations sufficient to produce a carboxyhemoglobin level greater than 5%.
Id. at V-4. However, some studies suggest that deleterious myocardial effects can occur
at 3 to 5% carboxyhemoglobin in patients with angina pector's. Id. at V-3. Other
studies have suggested that there is no safe level of carbon monoxide for some heart
patients, that "even 'normal' amounts of carbon monoxide may operate as the last
straw in precipitating coronary attacks." Id. at 111-14. The significance of the issue
is demonstrated by the remarks of Dr. Betram D. Dinman, medical director of Aluminum Co. of America, Pittsburgh, Pa., reported in BNA, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY &
HEALTH REPORTER Vol. 3, No. 29, at 920 (Dec. 20, 1973), wherein it was noted that
most workers who are over forty years old suffer from some form of latent coronary
affliction.
108. See note 8 supra.
109. BNA, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH REPORTER Vol. 3, No. 29, at 919
(Dec. 20, 1973).
110. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 137.3(e) (1973).
111. A total of 25,000 inspections are anticipated during the first year of operation
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However, a more serious problem, somewhat related to the usual inadequate resources, is the real possibility that the tobacco smoke pollution problem will not be taken seriously by the administrative agency
involved, resulting in a lack of enforcement of the standards when
applied to tobacco smoke.' 12 The tobacco smoke problem has only
recently come into recognition as a health hazard to the nonsmoker
and may be too easily dismissed by administrators who are accustomed
to the ubiquity of tobacco smokers and are more comfortable dealing
with the more traditional occupational health and safety problems encountered in the factory. Then the nonsmoker is faced with the difficult task of legally compelling the bureaucratic machinery to work.
RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

The review of various legal bases for assertion of nonsmokers' rights
in Illinois has revealed a general absence of consideration for this type
of problem. The constitution of Illinois provides a right which is difficult and expensive to enforce in the context of the nonsmokers' rights
problem. Nuisance law presents the same general enforcement problems along with a heavy tradition in property law that does not transfer easily to the problem at hand. Air pollution legislation has addressed the health aspect of the problem and then left a large part
of the problem unsolved by ignoring the fact that people have to
breathe the air inside of buildings as well as outside. This statutory
gap is the result of focusing on protection of the environment rather
than the individual in the legislative plan.
The one bright spot on the horizon may be the Health and Safety
Act of Illinois, which has a great potential for protecting the nonsmoker within the work environment. The nonsmoking employee
need not institute the expensive, traditional lawsuit to enforce his
rights under this legislation. Standards based on health considerations
have already been set for at least one of the constituents of tobacco
smoke, carbon monoxide. The enforcement machinery is already in
of the Illinois state plan.

The projected staff requirement for the first year, which

covers Illinois' 5,000,000 workers, includes 137 safety compliance personnel and 20 industrial hygienists. Illinois will receive $1,167,934 in operational grants from the federal government through June 30, 1974. Illinois OSHA Occupational Safety & Health
Bulletin, Vol. 2, No. 1, at 4 (January, 1974).
112. Kenneth W. Holland, Illinois Director of Labor, has already warned employees
that the filing of "frivolous" or "insupportable" complaints will be counter-productive
and will quickly destroy the credibility of the employee or organization making them.

His remarks were intended to discourage the use of the occupational safety and health
program for the purpose of inconveniencing or disciplining the employer but may also

reveal an underlying judgment as to what types of complaints the Department of Labor
will seriously entertain. Id. at 6.
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existence under the Illinois Department of Labor. Since the plan is
new because of recent adoption of the federal occupational health and
safety program, traditional types of complaints have not yet had a
chance to develop to the exclusion of others. The nonsmoking employee should certainly seek to enforce his rights to air free of tobacco
smoke under this law.
Whatever protection the Illinois Health and Safety Act provides to
nonsmokers does not operate in the nonworking situation. The objective here is not to control the smoker in the privacy of his own home
or in private gatherings. However, the nonsmoker should be able to
go to places open to the public without facing bombardment by the
tobacco smoke of others. To this end, the Illinois General Assembly
should follow the lead of the Arizona legislature, which recently declared smoking tobacco in any form to be a public nuisance if done
in certain specified places used by or open to the public." 3 The
Arizona law prohibits smoking in elevators, indoor theaters, libraries,
art museums, concert halls, and busses.'
Although a step in the
right direction, the Arizona provision is much too narrow to provide
meaningful protection to the nonsmoking public. Therefore, any proposed Illinois law should provide broader coverage, endeavoring to
cover all places open to or used by the public. Coverage should include all stores, restaurants, and other businesses open to the public,
hospitals, doctors' offices, educational institutions, and city, state and
county buildings.
Provision in such a law could be made for smoking areas set aside
for the convenience of those who smoke. However, the areas set
aside should not be such as to defeat the objective of the law. For
instance, any restroom area set aside for smoking should be separated from other areas of the restroom, and equivalent nonsmoking
lounge areas should be provided.
Violation of such a proposed law banning smoking in public places
could subject the violator to a fine, which should be high enough to
deter and low enough to ensure a reasonable expectation of enforcement. Arizona provides for a fine of ten to one hundred dollars,'"
which seems acceptable provided that any fine above fifteen dollars
is reserved for unusual cases.
Admittedly, this combination approach, i.e., a solution based partly
113.

Az. REv.

114.
115.

Id. § 36.601.01.A.
Id. § 36.601.01.B.

630

STAT.

§ 36-601.01 (Supp. 1973).

1974

Nonsmokers' Rights

on the existing Illinois occupational safety and health program and
partly on a public nuisance statute, does not completely solve the problem. The nonsmoker still cannot expect to attend a private gathering
without facing the tobacco smoke problem. However, the approach
does permit the nonsmoker to work, conduct most of his business and
enjoy much indoor recreation in an environment free of tobacco smoke
pollution.
LYNN

F. VUICH

